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AIDS IN PRISON: JUDICIAL INDIFUERENCE
TO THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES
THREATENS THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INCARCERATION
I. INTRODUCTION

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome' is a relatively new disease

with which society has not yet learned to cope. It has been some time
since society has confronted an epidemic, and, not surprisingly, the

medical, moral, and social questions presented by AIDS seem
frighteningly unfamiliar. 2 AIDS also has presented the justice system with

some particularly troubling issues. One such issue involves the
implications that arise when members of society are imprisoned in

correctional facilities where an infectious, fatal disease exists and
continues to spread.'
Presently, protection against AIDS for incarcerated individuals is

virtually nonexistent. The Eighth Amendment requires, at a minimum, that
individuals forced to serve a prison sentence do not receive punishment
that is cruel and unusual.4 Many prisoners have brought actions alleging
that their punishment is cruel and unusual because they are forced to live
in an environment overly conducive to the transmission of the AIDS virus,
HIV.5 This note suggests that unless correctional authorities enact certain
minimal measures in order to decrease the spread of HIV within these
systems, the inmates' constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual

@ Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Law Review.
1. For purposes of this note, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome will be
referred to by its common name, AIDS.
2. See generally Scott Isaacman & Michael Closen, A Brief Introduction to
Infectious Diseases, in AIDs CASES AND MATFRIALS 1, 1-46 (The John Marshall
Publishing Co. ed., 1989) (providing an introduction to infectious diseases for the
layperson).
3. See, e.g., Aids in Prison, WASH. POST, July 19, 1991, at A18 (discussing
problems presented by AIDS in Washington, D.C. prisons); Fern Shen, Segregation
Rejected for Maryland'sHIV Inmates, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1992, at B3 (discussing a
lawsuit brought by HIV-negative inmates seeking that HIV-positive inmates be segregated
from the general prison population).
4. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("nor [shall] cruel and unusual punishments [be]
inflicted").
5. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 737 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y.
1990); Feigley v. Fulcomer, 720 F. Supp. 475 (M.D. Pa. 1989); see also infra notes 98127 and accompanying text.
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punishment is being violated. 6 Consider, for example, the inmate whose
two-year term of incarceration leads to the contraction of a fatal disease.
In this scenario, the inmate's ultimate punishment should be seen as
outweighing the severity of the crime committed, thereby violating the
Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court's most recent ruling in a case involving an Eighth
Amendment challenge, Hudson v. McMillian,7 should be interpreted as
setting the appropriate standard against which Eighth Amendment claims
should be measured. In Hudson, the Court concluded that the force used
by prison guards, which caused minor bruises and swelling on an inmate's
body, was violative of the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual.' This
note argues that because the infliction of minor bruises may violate the
Eighth Amendment, the actions of prison officials tolerating a prison
environment that increases the probability of inmates contracting HIV are
similarly cruel and unusual.9
This note examines the disproportionate effect of AIDS on persons
within the criminal justice system. Part II of this note explores the nature
of AIDS-specifically identifying the characteristics of AIDS that present
apparently insurmountable obstacles to halting its progression. Part III
addresses the disproportionate rate of -IV infection within the nation's
correctional facilities. A correlation between the inmates' high-risk
behavior both before and during incarceration is suggested as the link to
high rates of HIV infection among those currently incarcerated."0
Furthermore, Part III compares prisoners' constitutional rights with
those of non-incarcerated members of society to examine the ability of
inmates to protect themselves from contracting HIV. This note argues that
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
should be the vehicle through which prisoners demand that the government
act affirmatively to decrease the spread of HIV within correctional
facilities."
Part III.B analyzes cases brought against the government by prisoners
who claim that their Eighth Amendment rights have been violated because
they face a substantially increased risk of contracting HIV while
incarcerated. The opinions in these cases suggest that correctional
6. See infra part V.
7. 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992).
8. See id. at 998-1102 (holding that the use of excessive physical force against a
prisoner may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even when the inmate does not
suffer serious physical injury).
9. See infra part III.B.
10. See infra part I.
11. See infra part II.B.
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authorities must provide a minimum standard of protection in order to
avoid liability in an Eighth Amendment suit based on the contraction of
HIV in prison.12 Part IV identifies the mandatory and permissive policies
the courts suggest as beneficial attempts to control the spread of 4IV
within correctional facilities. 13 A discussion of these policies, along with
certain jurisdictional views on this issue, concludes this note.

H. AIDS-THE DISEASE
To adequately analyze the legal issues AIDS presents, it is important
to understand the nature of the disease. AIDS is a "fatal, infectious disease
for which there is no known cure, and its sufferers appear to remain
infectious for life." 14 A human retrovirus, known as Human
Immunodeficiency Virus, or IRV, is now accepted as the etiological agent
for AIDS and for an array of related conditions. 15 Retroviruses are so
named because they contain a unique enzyme encoded in their genes and
in the infectious virion, which enables them to make DNA copies of
infectious RNA.16 This system allows HIV to spread throughout the cells
of an infected host. 17
HIV impairs the victim's immune system, enabling normally benign
organisms to flourish destructively in the infected host.18 Organisms that
are present in everyday life, which have no effect on healthy individuals,
may cause life-threatening illnesses in immune-suppressed AIDS patients.
HIV causes a predictable, progressive derangement of immune functions,
with AIDS being a late-stage manifestation of that process.19
Mounting evidence indicates that HIV transmission occurs only
through sexual contact, use of contaminated needles or syringes, exposure
to infected blood or blood products, or transplanted tissue or organs from
an infected donor.' Attempts to control the disease by traditional public12. See infra part H.A.
13. See infra part IV.
14. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CONFRONTING AIDS UPDATE: 1988, at 1
(National Academy of Sciences ed., 1988) [hereinafter AIDS UPDATE].

15. See Robert R. Redfield & Donald S. Burke, H1VInfection: The ClinicalPicture,
SCi. AM., Oct. 1988, at 90.
16. See FlossieWong-Staal &RobertC. Gallo, Human T-lymphotropicRetroviruses,
317 NATURE 395, 396-98 (1985) (discussing human T-lymphotropic viruses, including
HTLV-II, also known as HIV).
17. See Redfield & Burke, supra note 15, at 93.
18. See id. at 90.
19. Id.
20. See AIDS UPDATE, supra note 14, at 3.
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health measures are complicated by the fact that AIDS predominantly
occurred first in societally stigmatized groups-i.e. homosexual men and
intravenous drug users.21 As a result, "the social response to the disease
has been confounded by moralistic assignments of blame."' As
previously stated, there is presently no known cure for AIDS; it is an
irreversible, fatal disease.' Scientific data suggests that if no treatment
is discovered or developed to slow or halt the progress of the infection,
the vast majority of persons who carry HIV antibodies will eventually
suffer from AIDS.3
The Centers for Disease Control has documented that a cumulative
total of more than 152,000 cases of AIDS has been reported in the United
States.' This number includes neither unreported cases nor cases of
individuals who, because of the long incubation period of the virus, are
not yet aware that they carry HIV. 5 AIDS has reached epidemic
proportions in the United States, and there is every indication that its
magnitude will continue to escalate.
In March 1991, the National Commission on Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome called attention to the plight of inmates in the
nation's correctional facilities by stating "[tihat no other institution in this
society has a higher concentration of people at substantial risk of HIV
infection."' Assuming this is true, a prison sentence can be viewed as a
factor that substantially increases the risk of contracting HIV. As society
continues to adapt its policies to decrease the spread of AIDS, it also must
consider factors that contribute to the AIDS epidemic in correctional
facilities. The conditions that lead to the increased risk of contracting HIV
in prison demand attention. Most notably, incidence rates are predictably
higher in the correctional setting than in the population-at-large because
there is a higher concentration of individuals with histories of high-risk
behavior, particularly intravenous drug use.' The transmission of HIV
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id.

23. Id.
24. THEODORE M. HAMMETT & SAIRA MoINI, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,

U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, AIDS BULLETIN 2 (Sept. 1990) [hereinafter AIDS BULLETIN].
25. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN

SERVICES, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT 5 (Dec. 1991).
26. See Redfield & Burke, supra note 15, at 94. The virus is usually present in the
blood stream for three to six months before it can be documented by the antigen/antibody
tests used to detect the presence of HIV. Id.
27. NATIONAL COMISSION ON ACQUIRE IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME, HIV
DISEASE IN CORRETONALFACILrrIES, REPORT 1, 18 (1991) [hereinafter HIV DISEASE].

28. See Wendy Melillo, Aids in Prison, WASH. POST, July 9, 1991, at A18.
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in prisons primarily occurs in one of two ways: exchanging bodily fluids
during sexual conduct or sharing needles during intravenous drug use. 29
These two behaviors are documented as being the highest-risk behaviors
for HIV transmission.'
According to one report, development of a scheme for mandatory
sentencing in drug offenses has resulted in alarming percentages of drug
offenders within the federal system-to a predicted level of seventy
percent by 1995.2 1 A similar study, conducted in San Diego, New York,
Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C., reported that seventy percent of all
arrestees had tested positive for the presence of one or more intravenous
drugs in their bloodstream at the time of their arrests.32 The same study
reported that in New York, twenty-four percent of male, and thirty
percent of female arrestees admitted having used intravenous drugs at
some time.33 Another study, conducted in 1985, concluded that the vast
majority of inmates with AIDS were either current or former intravenous
drug users.'
The experiences of the inmates at the California Institute for Women
at Frontera (CMW) exemplify the highly infectious and potentially deadly
nature of the nation's prisons. CIW officials estimate that more than ninety
percent of CIW inmates have been convicted of crimes related to drug
use.35 As a result, these women typically are at greater risk for HIV
infection, even before incarceration.' Once behind bars, the drug use
continues, despite the ostensible lack of syringes and needles.37 One
woman imprisoned at CIW reported that drug use among the prisoners
was rampant.3" After being granted parole, she stated that "[t]here's
more dope in [C1W] than on the street."3 9
29. AIDS BULLETIN, supra note 24, at 4.
30. See Urvashi Vaid, Prisons, in AIDS AND THE LAW 235, 237-38 (Harlon L.
Dalton et al. eds., 1987).
31. THEODORE M. HAMMETr & SAIRA MoINI, NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1990 UPDATE: AIDS IN CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES 12 (1991)
[hereinafter T. HAMMETr STUDY].
32. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1989, at 52 (1990).

33. Id.
34. Vaid, supra note 30, at 237-38.
35. See Shawn M. Boyne, Note, Women in Prison with AIDS: An Assault on the
Constitution, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 741, 751 (1991).
36. See id. at 752.
37. id. at 753.
38. id.
39. Id.
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The drug use at CIW illustrates the insidious nature of drug addiction.
Drugs are supplied illegally by both visitors and by prison guards.4
CIW's walls present an insignificant obstacle to drug smugglers. 41 To
facilitate their drug use, for example, inmates steal used syringes from
CIW's medical department, even though they know that HIV can be
contracted through the use of contaminated needles.42 Similarly, one
paroled inmate left her syringe for another inmate so that she could more
easily continue her drug use.'
Unsafe sexual practices, particularly among male homosexuals, are
estimated to be the method of contraction in sixty percent of the known
AIDS cases." It is undisputed that both consensual and coerced
homosexual contact is a common occurrence in most, if not all,
correctional facilities.' For example, a study conducted within the
Philadelphia correctional system documented that 2000 out of a total of
60,000 inmates were the victims of sexual assaults within a twenty-sixmonth period.' This same study reported that "[v]irtually every slightlybuilt young man committed by the courts is sexually approached within
hours after his admission to prison."47 These figures do not even
represent the most prevalent type of sexual intercourse among
inmates-consensual sex." It is clear that behaviors conducive to the
transmission of HIV are highly prevalent among individuals both before
and during incarceration.
The disparity between the risk of contracting HIV by those in
correctional facilities and the risk borne by the public at large is well
illustrated by the results of a study conducted by the National Institute of
Justice.49 This study showed that the incidence rate of AIDS cases for the
general population was 14.65 cases per 100,000 people, while the
aggregate incidence rate in federal and state correctional facilities was 202
cases per 100,000 inmates.' As of October 1991, 6985 inmates in
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
T. HAMMETrT STUDY, supra note 31, at 11.

45. Vaid, supra note 30, at 238.
46. DANmL LocKwooD, PRisON SExuAL VIOLE CE 7 (Michael Gnat ed., 1980)
(citing A.J. Davis, Sexual Assaults in the PhiladelphiaPrisonSystem and Sheriff's Vans,
6 TRANs-ACTION 8-16 (1968)).
47. Id.
48. See Vaid, supranote 30, at 238.
49. AIDS BuILETN, supra note 24, at 4.
50. Id.
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51 Further, 2125 AIDSfederal and state systems were infected with HIV.
related inmate deaths were not included in this report.5 2 A study has
shown that the infection rate among prisoners on the national level is
between 2.1% and 5.9% of the total prison population. 3 New York
State, however, reports an infection rate of 17.4% among its prisoners.'"
It has recently been reported that AIDS was the leading cause of death
behind New York's prison walls, resulting in more than 900 fatalities. 55
These statistics demonstrate that IV is spreading dramatically within
the nation's correctional facilities. They also provide the basis for a legal
dilemma the courts have yet to resolve-namely, what minimal safeguards
our prisons must implement to protect inmates from contracting HIV to
honor the Eighth Amendment's command.

III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
The current crisis in the nation's prison systems gives rise to
significant constitutional questions. Prisoners' constitutional claims,
however, cannot be fully understood without an initial discussion of the
contrast between constitutional rights afforded to prisoners and those
conferred on non-incarcerated members of society.
Prison inmates do not completely surrender their constitutional rights
upon incarceration.' Prisoners, however, are afforded less constitutional
protection against government intrusion than the non-inmate population.57
To clarify this distinction, the Supreme Court noted in Bell v. Woflsh5"
that "[s]imply because prison inmates retain certain constitutional rights
does not mean that these rights are not subject to restrictions and
limitations. . . . There must be a 'mutual accommodation between
institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution
that are of general application.'" "
51. T. HAMMEIT STUDY, supra note 31, at 12.

52. Id.
53. AIDS BULLETN, supranote 24, at 4.

54. Id.
55. See ALI ABDUL MALIK, AIDS in Prison-WhoReally Cares?, PWA SUPPORT,
3 (1991).
56. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987).
57. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) (implying that
transgressions against the constitutional rights of inmates are not necessarily evaluated
under the same standards as those applied when the complainant is a free citizen).
58. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
59. Id. at 545-46 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)).
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The Court further noted in Bell that to meet the legitimate goals and
policies required by the penal institution, prisoners' rights may be limited
and administrators' decisions involving the impingement of these rights
must be given "wide-ranging deference. " ' ° More specifically, the
importance of a prisoner's constitutional claim must be weighed against
the penological interest furthered by implementing the challenged
policy. 6' The custodial relationship between the inmates and the
government creates a constitutionally recognized affirmative duty for the
government to provide inmates with certain elementary protective
services. 2 Although prison officials usually have discretion in
determining and applying correctional policies,' the AIDS crisis in the
nation's prisons may warrant a broad protective policy from the national
level. Courts should determine whether the likelihood of contracting HIV
while incarcerated poses such a danger to inmates that the Constitution
mandates elementary protective measures.
A. The Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution states,
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."" Recognizing the difficulties
presented in assessing prisoners' Eighth Amendment claims, the Supreme
Court has found that there can be no static test "by which courts
determine whether conditions of confinement are cruel and unusual, for
the Eighth Amendment 'must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.'"'
To determine if a condition or treatment infringes on Eighth Amendment
rights, the Court considers whether the situation is incompatible with
evolving standards of decency.' Treatment that involves unnecessary or
wanton infliction of pain is similarly unconstitutional, as are conditions of
an inmate's confinement that are grossly disproportionate to the severity
of the crime. 7
60. Id. at 547.
61. Id.
62. Losinskd v. County of Tempealeau, 946 F.2d 544, 549-50 (7th Cir. 1991).
63. Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 1985).
64. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIH.
65. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
66. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
67. See 452 U.S. at 348.
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Courts have expressed conflicting views, however, as to the extent of
responsibility carried by prison officials for conditions of confinement. For
example, one court held that the state, at the minimum, must provide a
"safe and human" place of confinement for its inmates. But the
Supreme Court has espoused a contrasting view, finding that restrictive
and harsh conditions of confinement are a part of the penalty that criminal
offenders must pay for their offenses against society.' Writing for the
majority in Atiyeh v. Capps,7' Justice Rehnquist wrote:
[N]obody promised [the inmates] a rose garden; and I know of
nothing in the Eighth Amendment which requires that they be
housed in a manner most pleasing to them, or considered by even
most knowledgeable penal authorities to be likely to avoid
confrontations, psychological depression, and the like. They have
been convicted of a crime, and there is nothing in the Constitution
which forbids their being penalized as a result of that
conviction. 7'
It appears that a certain level of responsibility exists on behalf of the
prison officials; the extent of that responsibility, however, remains
unclear.
Perhaps the courts are reluctant to declare certain prison conditions
unconstitutional because such a decision would create serious
repercussions. The Supreme Court has noted that it must act cautiously in
declaring a particular punishment or condition impermissible under the
Eighth Amendment because, unless the Court subsequently reverses itself,
the decision cannot be reversed short of a constitutional amendment.'
Despite the ramifications of such a decision, one court was willing to find
that a prisoner's suit was not barred by the Eleventh Amendment and an
entire state prison system may be so inhumane as to violate the Eighth
Amendment's bar on cruel and unusual punishment.7' The opinion
cautioned that courts cannot defer to the discretion of prison officials in
matters concerning the constitutional rights of prisoners.74
68. LaRoccav. Dalsheim, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 310 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (articulating and
reinforcing a basic constitutional premise that prisoners may not be housed in an
inhumane setting).
69. See 452 U.S. at 347.
70. 449 U.S. 1312 (1981).
71. Id. at 1315-16.
72. See 452 U.S. at 351 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976)).
73. See Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 306-08 (8th Cir. 1971).
74. See id. at 309.

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

In Hudson v. McMillian, the Supreme Court's most recent ruling on
an Eighth Amendment challenge, the Court held that prison beatings can
be unconstitutionally cruel and unusual even if they only result in minor
bruises and swelling." The Court focused on whether the actions of the
prison guards represented a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline. 6 Thus, the Court's scrutiny in Hudson focused specifically on
the actions of the prison personnel.' It therefore would seem that prison
officials' failure to respond to the heightened transmission rate of the
AIDS virus in prisons also would be considered to violate the Eighth
Amendment.
B. Case Law
Since the beginning of the AIDS epidemic, just more than a decade
ago, numerous lawsuits have been brought by inmates against prison
officials, prison systems, and states based on the existence of HIV/AIDS
within the prison population. Not surprisingly, the number of suits has
increased within the past few years as the number of infected prisoners has
increased drastically.' These suits typically allege that prisoners are
being subjected to cruel and unusual punishment by prison-system policies
that do not adequately protect prisoners from the risk of contracting HIV
while incarcerated. 9 The cases have dealt with many unique factual
scenarios, limiting the precedential value of each holding.
Courts have not been presented with an Eighth Amendment challenge
in which the prisoner alleges that he or she contracted HIV while
incarcerated and that, therefore, a consequence of the inmate's sentence
was contraction of the fatal disease. The statistics strongly suggest,
however, that a case like this will reach the courts sometime in the near
future."
In the early stages of the AIDS crisis, two courts delivered opinions
appearing to establish the viability of lawsuits by prisoners incarcerated in
75. See Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995, 1000-01 (1992).
76. See id. at 999.

77. See id.
78. See infra notes 90-136 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text.
80. See T. HAMMEr STUDY, supranote 31, at 65-66 (discussing cases challenging
prison facilities' policies and practices regarding HIV antibody testing, segregation, and
medical care).
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facilities conducive to transmission of infectious diseases.81 In Smith v.
Sullivan,' the Fifth Circuit held that a prison policy that allowed inmates
with contagious or communicable diseases to be incarcerated in the midst
of other inmates, without medical attention for a month, violated the
Eighth Amendment's "standard of adequate medical attention. " '
Similarly, in Lareau v. Manson," the Second Circuit concluded, with
respect to a prisoner's burden of proof in such an Eighth Amendment
case, "that it is unnecessary to require evidence that an infectious disease
has actually spread in an overcrowded jail before issuing a remedy. "I
After considering the prison systems' failure to adequately screen
newly arrived inmates for communicable diseases," the court in Lareau
concluded that the systems' failure to act created a threat to the health of
all inmates that surely would violate the Eighth Amendment for it is
"'sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs'" of inmates." Because these cases were decided before
the escalation of the AIDS epidemic, however, it must be noted that the
courts' decisions were not made in contemplation of the crisis to come. As
a result, it appears that these cases have not been followed. The standards
they seemingly espouse have been treated as little more than dictum.
In Eighth Amendment cases, prison officials are held to the standard
of care established by the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble.88 In
Estelle, the Court held that prison personnel displaying deliberate
indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment." Lower courts have applied this standard, which
predates the AIDS epidemic, to cases dealing with AIDS in prisons with
increasing scrutiny.
81. See Lareauv. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981); Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d
373 (5th Cir. 1977). In these cases, the courts were confronted with sexually transmitted
diseases other than AIDS.
82. 553 F.2d at 373. Prisoners brought an Eighth Amendment suit based on the
conditions of their confinement. See id. at 375. One of their complaints was an objection
to being confined with inmates who had contagious diseases such as scabies or
gonorrhea. See id. at 380. The inmates were not examined for possible infections by
medical personnel for, at times, over a month. See id.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See id. at 380.
651 F.2d at 96.
Id. at 109.
See id.
Id. (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).

88. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).

89. See id. at 104.
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For example, in Deutsch v. Federal Bureau of Prisons,9' the court
considered the claim of a prisoner housed with a cellmate who tested
positive for HIV antibodies.91 The prisoner was not informed that his
assigned cellmate had tested positive for HIV antibodies.' In denying
the prisoner's motion for summary judgment, the court found that the
prisoner was required to establish facts showing that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to his medical needs.' Because the prisoner did
not establish that the prison officials deliberately exposed the prisoner to
the risk of contracting M1V, the court concluded that the prisoner's claim
did not satisfy the "deliberate indifference" standard necessary to prove
an Eighth Amendment violation.'
The standard applied by the court in Deutsch, however, appears to
conflict with the Supreme Court's holding in Whitley v. Albers.95 In
Whitley, the Court acknowledged that a prisoner does not have to prove
prison officials' intention to inflict unnecessary pain on the prisoner to
prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim.' Accordingly, the standard to
show an Eighth Amendment violation is not a bright-line test.'
In Feigley v. Fulcomer," an inmate alleged that his Eighth
Amendment rights were violated by prison officials who failed to
adequately protect him from the risk of contracting HIV.' The prisoner,
George Feigley, argued that the officials' failure to test inmates for HIV
violated his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment." ° The court announced that the deliberate-indifference
analysis would not be applied in a case in which the prisoner's chance of
contracting a fatal disease remained only a possibility, rather than a
90. 737 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id. at266.
Id.
See id. at 267.
See id.
475 U.S. 312 (1986).
See id. at 319 (relying on Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)).
97. See id.
98. 720 F. Supp. 475 (M.D. Pa. 1989).
99. See id. at 476.
100. See id. at 478. The prisoner also asserted that three other practices of the

defendants violated the Constitution: (1) the failure to test inmates routinely for HIV;
(2) the failure to test inmates for HIV upon request; and (3) the failure to segregate HIVinfected inmates automatically. Id. at 481-82. The court awarded summary judgment for
the defendants and against Feigley on all claims except on the claim of testing an inmate
upon that inmate's request. Id. at 485.
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certainty." ° According to the court, because Feigley had not contracted
the fatal disease, the basis of his suit rested merely upon Feigley's belief
that he had been exposed to an increased risk of contracting HIV. The
court held that potential exposure did not violate Feigley's Eighth
Amendment rights.102
The Court's holding in Fulcomer, however, conflicts with Lareau v.
Manson,"°3 which involved prison overcrowding. In Lareau, the court
found that the failure to adequately screen newly arrived inmates for
communicable diseases was evidence of deliberate indifference of the
inmates' rights and presumably a violation of the Eighth Amendment.'
Courts have reconciled this conflict by finding that prisoners' right to
privacy takes precedence over the decision in Lareau to test newly arrived
prisoners. 05
One court noted that the state is obligated "'to provide a safe and
humane place of confinement for its inmates,'" including measures to
protect prisoners from possible transmission of IV by force."° The
court refrained from addressing this issue and instead dismissed the action,
leaving the problem of protecting prisoners from contracting HIV to the
discretion of the legislature and prison administrations.'0 7 In a similar
class-action suit commenced by inmates, the court found that the plaintiffs
failed to establish that there was a prevalent risk of contracting IIV within
the system."0 ' The court subsequently ruled against the prisoners in their
Eighth Amendment challenge." ° The trends among related cases suggest
that courts avoid addressing the question at issue: whether placing inmates
in a prison environment that substantially increases their risk of
contracting HIV violates the Eighth Amendment. Rather than condemn the
entire prison system, courts have bypassed this issue.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 475.
103. 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
104. See id. at 109. In fact, the court found that "it is unnecessary to require
evidence that an infectious disease has actually spread in an overcrowded jail before
issuing a remedy." Id.
105. See, e.g., Woods v. White, 689 F. Supp. 874 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (recognizing
that prison medical-service personnel violated a prisoner's right to privacy by disclosing,
in casual discussion, the fact that Woods had tested positive for HIV).
106. LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 310 (Sup. Ct. 1983) (quoting
N.Y.CoRR. L. §§ 70(2), 23(2)).
107. See id. at 311.
108. See Jarrett v. Faulkner, 622 F. Supp. 928, 928-29 (S.D. Ind. 1987).
109. See id.
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Courts have applied increasingly restrictive definitions of deliberate
indifference to their analysis of Eighth Amendment challenges regarding
the danger of contracting HIV in prisons. In Wilson v. United States
Public Health Services,110 a prisoner claimed to have been exposed to
the AIDS virus while incarcerated."' The prisoner alleged that he was
exposed when he participated in a study that focused on transmission of
HTLV-III,1 2 which was conducted as a result of a contract between the
United States Public Health Service and the Illinois Department of
Corrections among adult male inmates in correctional facilities.11,
Wilson was not able to prove that he contracted HIV through his
involvement in the study and was, therefore, unable to allege negligent
action or wrongful conduct on the part of the Health Service or any other
federal agency or employee."' The court dismissed
the action, finding
11 5
that the inmate failed to show personal injury.
In Jezick v. Frame,"' a prisoner's Eighth Amendment challenge
again proved unsuccessful. In its decision, the court described the type of
evidence that the prisoner would be required to present and mandated that
the prisoner outline those conditions of his confinement that jeopardized
his personal safety. 7 For example, the prisoner must state whether he
was confined in the same area as a person with AIDS and whether the unit
was supervised by prison personnel to ensure that no intimate contact
occurred.1 The prisoner must also be able to describe the role of each
defendant in relation to his housing assignment.119 The court found that
simply living in the same room as a person with AIDS is not enough to
require judicial intervention, even though statistical evidence of rape and
violence in prison shows just how dangerous this situation may be.'2
Another case that may provide a basis of liability for the transmission
of AIDS within prison is Withers v. Levine.12 Although the court in
110. 731 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
111. See id.
112. See generally Redfield & Burke, supra note 15. HTLV-II is another term
used to describe HIV.
113. See Wilson, 731 F. Supp. at 845.
114. See id. at 846.

115. See id. at 845.
116. No. 87-5248, 1988 WL 2045 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 1988).
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. Id.
121. 615 F.2d 158, 162 (4th Cir. 1980).
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Withers was not specifically dealing with the AIDS question, the court

found that prison officials were negligent for placing an inmate, who had
a history of violent sexual assaults, into a cell with the plaintiff."

The

court stated that "[w]hen there is present in a prison... a pervasive risk
of harm to all prisoners, . . . the constitutional prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment requires that prison officials exercise reasonable
care to provide reasonable protection from such unreasonable risk of
harm. "" The prison officials suggested increasing the standard of proof
for negligence in a case such as this one because the complainant was a
convicted criminal. 1 The court rejected this argument finding that a
higher standard would render the prisoner's constitutional rights
"unredressed."' 2s The court held that the prison officials were negligent
for their failure to appropriately protect the prisoner and that they had

violated Withers's Eighth Amendment rights." The court ordered
prison officials to devise procedures to protect prisoners from
unreasonable risks of harm."
In Portee v. Tollison,l however, the court recently added
additional requirements to the deliberate-indifference standard, decreasing
the likelihood of successful litigation by a prisoner." The prisoners

brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that South Carolina's
prison policies violated the prisoners' civil rights because the policies did
122. See id.
123. Id. For cases in which the court found that prison officials' actions constituted
deliberate indifference, see Smith-Bey v. Hospital Adm'r., 841 F.2d 751, 758-59 (7th
Cir. 1988); Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392, 393-96 (7th Cir. 1988); Walsh v.
Mellas, 837 F.2d 789, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1988); Pressly v. Hutto, 816 F.2d 977, 979 (4th
Cir. 1987); Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 790 F.2d 1220, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986). For cases in
which Eighth Amendment challenges were rejected, see Williams v. Willits, 853 F.2d
586, 591 (8th Cir. 1988); Blankenship v. Meachum, 840 F.2d 741, 742-43 (10th Cir.
1988); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 794 (4th Cir. 1987); Johnston v. Lucas, 786
F.2d 1254, 1260 (5th Cir. 1986).
124. See 615 F.2d at 161.
125. Id. at 162.
126. See id.

127. See id. at 161.
128. 753 F. Supp. 184 (D.S.C. 1990).
129. See id. at 186-87 (citing Glick v. Henderson, 855 F.2d 536 (8th Cir. 1988);
Deutsch v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 737 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Feigley v.
Fulcomer, 720 F. Supp. 475 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Davis v. Stanley, 740 F. Supp. 815
(N.D. Ala. 1987)). The court elevated the standard of proof by requiring the plaintiff to
show that there is "'a pervasive risk of harm to inmates of contracting AIDS [followed
by] a failure of prison officials to reasonably respond to that risk.'" Id.
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not adequately protect them from the risk of contracting IIIV. 13° The
standard employed by the court required "evidence of a 'serious medical
and emotional deterioration attributable to' a challenged condition," and
the court found that mere negligence on the part of prison officials was
insufficient to allow recovery. Prison officials' deliberate indifference
to prison conditions or the serious medical needs of the prisoners must
cause actual harm before prison conditions violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.13 The court
held that the prison officials' negligence was not sufficient to permit
recovery, and, therefore, the Eighth Amendment was not violated. 33 If
the prisoners had shown, however, that there was a "pervasive risk of
harm" to the inmates, and that the prison officials had failed to respond
to such risk, the plaintiffs would have a claim under § 1983.1'
Although this case provides hope for inmates who will bring similar
suits in the future, it poses two significant questions: What will a court
consider to be proof of a pervasive risk of contracting HIV, and what
constitutes evidence establishing the prison officials' failure to respond to
that risk? Would a prisoner who contracted HIV while incarcerated be
considered to have established, per se, a pervasive risk of that harm? If
so, would the risk be viewed as an isolated risk to the infected prisoner
alone or would it extend to all prisoners within that particular facility? In
response to the officials' failure to act, the courts usually reason that
because HIV is transferred by sexual contact or intravenous drug use, both
of which are prohibited by virtually every prison system, officials have
responded to the risk.135 How persuasive is this argument if the prisoner
contracted the AIDS virus through a sexual assault by an infected
prisoner? It appears that a court presented with this scenario would be
forced to declare a violation of the Eighth Amendment under the standard
set forth in Portee.'3
IV. AIDS AND PENAL POLICY

In response to the escalation of the AIDS epidemic within the
correctional setting, most facilities have implemented certain guidelines
and policies in an effort to control the spread of HIV. Although the
130. See id. at 184.
131. See id. at 185 (quoting Shraderv. White, 761 F.2d 975, 979 (4th Cir. 1985)).
132. Id.

133. See id. at 186-87.
134. Id. at 186.

135. See supranotes 121-27 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
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effectiveness of these policies has yet to be determined, officials continue
to search for answers to questions that become more problematic as the
percentage of infected prisoners increases.137 Many policies utilized by
correctional systems have been challenged in federal and state courts.
Courts may impose different standards in order to determine the breadth
of the rights of prisoners already infected on the one hand and the rights
of prisoners who are merely seeking protection from the risk of infection
on the other hand. When prisoners sue the system for lack of protection
from the risk of infection, the court should examine policies utilized by
the particular institution to determine whether the prison officials' actions
evidence "deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's needs. A discussion
of some of the most widely used policies is appropriate, therefore, in
order to fully examine the viability of actions based on the risk of
contracting the AIDS virus while incarcerated."'
A. Testing Inmates for HIV
The first issue, a topic of much debate and legal controversy, is
whether prisons should test all prisoners for HIV. Beyond this question is
how such testing should be executed. Should there be mandatory mass
screening, voluntary or routine screening, or screening directed only at
persons perceived to fall within "high-risk" categories?
Several arguments have been proffered for requiring all inmates to
submit to HIV testing. Proponents argue that testing allows officials to
identify individuals who require treatment, to help slow the course of their
disease, and to provide them with adequate medical support.139 It is also
argued that testing will permit identification and segregation of infected
individuals, decreasing the spread of HIV within the system. "'o
As of 1990, seventeen jurisdictions have implemented mass screening
of prisoners.14 1 Ironically, the states that use mass-screening procedures
are the states with the lowest seroprevalence of the disease.142 This
result undoubtedly reflects the complex legal and ethical considerations
137.
138.
139.
140.

T. HAMMET STUDY, supra note 31, at 54.
See infra notes 139-212 and accompanying text.
See T. HAMMETr STUDY, supra note 31, at 43.
See Vaid, supra note 30, at 240; T. HAMMETr STUDY, supra note 31, at 44.
141. T. HAMMETT STUDY, supra note 31, at 43.
142. See HIV DISEASE, supranote 27, at 21; T. HAMMETr STUDY, supranote 31,
at 49. These states include: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Utah, and Wyoming. The states with the highest
seroprevalence include: New York, New Jersey, Florida, California, and Texas. T.
HAMMETr STUDY, supra note 31, at 49.
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that a state must consider in deciding whether to implement such a policy.
The opposition to mandatory testing in states with higher percentages of
AIDS-infected prisoners seems to have deterred the implementation of
mass screening.
The possibility of infringing upon the prisoner's right to privacy
presents the main obstacle to testing.14 Complete confidentiality is
probably impossible
in correctional settings because prisons are notorious
"rumor mills." 1" In addition, correctional officers want to know the
HIV status of the prisoners they oversee. 1" But when a positive result
becomes common knowledge to prison staff and other prisoners, the
infected prisoner may be discriminated against and harassed." In
response to this problem, it has been suggested that test results should not
be based on a "need-to-know" basis, but rather on specific policies that
determine "who" has such a need and "why." 7 It also has been
suggested that financial considerations maybe the greatest deterrent to
mass screening for segregational purposes.
The courts remain divided on the issue of testing. The most notable
decision came out of the Ninth Circuit case Walker v. Sutmer.1 49 In
Walker, the court held that the policy may not be reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests but it was for a jury to resolve the issues
of fact."5 The court reasoned that although "[p]rison walls do not form
a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the
Constitution," the prisoner's constitutional rights may nonetheless be
restricted to enable prison officials to achieve legitimate penological goals
and maintain safety. 51
On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit upheld Alabama's mandatorytesting policy in Harris v. Thigpen 52 on the ground that it was in
furtherance of legitimate correctional objectives. 53 In light of the
difficult choices thrust upon prison officials by the AIDS epidemic, a
143. See T. HAMMETT STUDY, supra note 31, at 46-49; see also Doe v. Coughlin,
697 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (N.D.N.Y. 1988) (concluding that disclosure of prisoners' HIV
status might cause irreparable harm and barring transfer of inmates to separate facilities).
144. T. HAMMETr STUDY, supranote 31, at 46.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
See Doe v. Coughlin, 697 F. Supp. 1234, 1237 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
See T. HAMMETr STUDY, supranote 31, at 49; Vaid, supranote 30, at 240.
See T. HAMMETr STUDY, supra note 31, at 43.

149. 917 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1990).
150. See id. at 387-88.
151. See id. at 385.
152. 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).
153. See id. at 1517.
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segregation policy, although restricting the privacy rights of HIV-positive
inmates, may be a reasonable protection of inmate health. , In the wake
of these conflicting holdings, correctional officials who want to adopt a
testing policy face a dilemma: what type of policy will fairly and
adequately protect prisoners without infringing on their rights in the
process?
Without constitutional guidelines for a mandatory AIDS-testing policy,
prison officials are required to exercise their best judgment in deciding
whether to test inmates. Special considerations must be given to protect
inmates who may be most severely harmed by such a policy. Rates of
seroprevalence, possibility of harassment or discrimination, and ability to
maintain confidentiality are factors that should be weighed in deciding
whether to implement a mandatory-testing policy within any correctional
system.
B. Segregation
Segregating prisoners with AIDS-or prisoners who test positive for
HIV-from the general inmate population is another policy that
correctional facilities have implemented to decrease the spread of the
virus. 155 Although highly controversial, twenty-five states segregate
infected prisoners to varying degrees: 1" sixteen states segregate all
prisoners with AIDS;5 7 five segregate those with some symptoms of the
disease;158 and four segregate prisoners who have tested positive for the
virus. 5 Several justifications have been offered to support segregating
infected individuals. First, it is argued that segregation protects infected
prisoners from diseases that they would be likely to come in contact with
if allowed to be "mainstreamed" with the general population." Second,
proponents of segregation argue that it allows for better management of
the inmates and an opportunity for specialized medical care.161 In
addition, it is argued that infected prisoners need protection from other
prisoners who fear AIDS.16 Finally, officials urge that segregation is
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
PROJEcT
161.
162.

See id. at 1521.
See infra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
T. HAmmEr STUDY, supra note 31, at 51-53.
Id. at 51-52.
Id.
Id. at 52-53.
See Urvashi Vaid, NPP Gathersthe Facts on AIDS in Prison, 6 NAT'L PRISON
J. 3 (Winter 1985).
See HIV DISEASE, supra note 27, at 22.
See Vaid, supra note 160, at 3.
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necessary to prevent the spread of HIV through intravenous drug use and
sexual activity in prison."
The underlying rationale and arguably unconstitutional effects of
segregation policies have been extensively debated in the courts. 1" For
the most part, courts have deferred to the discretion of correctional
officials when the policy is held to be based on legitimate health, safety,
or security considerations."e As a result, cases that challenge the
constitutionality of segregating inmates with HIV have generally been
decided in favor of segregation. One court, for example, upheld a
prison's policy that precluded IV-infected inmates from working on food
assignments. 1" This decision was based on the policy's reasonable effort
to maintain the order and security of the institution. 167 The court
reasoned that this was a legitimate concern despite the scientific evidence
indicating that HIV is not transmitted through food. " It appears that as
long as courts can justify their decisions based on the effect that a prison's
policy
has on order and security, suits against segregation policies will
19
fail. 6
Definite disadvantages exist in segregating HIV-positive inmates
within correctional facilities. Opponents of segregation argue that it "may
provide a false sense of security for inmates in [the] general population"
by fostering a belief that everyone who is not segregated is safe."T The
opponents reason that there is no way that every infected prisoner could
be separated from the general prison population due to testing errors, the
incubation period of the virus, and the difficulties encountered in
pinpointing the time of infection."7 In addition, these policies may
undermine prevention efforts addressed at the need to refrain from "risky"
behavior.' Moreover, many segregated prisoners report feelings of
163. See infra notes 170-76 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding
that medical care given by the prison system was not deliberately indifferent, and
mandatory testing was not violative of the prisoners' constitutional right to privacy).
165. See AIDS BULLETIN, supra note 24, at 10.
166. See Farmer v. Moritsugu, 742 F. Supp. 525, 527-28 (W.D. Wis. 1990).
167. See id. at 527.
168. See id. But see In re Westchester County Medical Ctr., 30 Gov't Empl. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 620 (April 27, 1992) (ruling by Department of Health and Human Services
administrative law judge that a medical facility violated § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
by discriminating against a pharmacist infected with HIV).
169. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
170. See HIV DISEASE, supra note 27, at 23.
171. See id. at 11, 22.
172. Id. at 23.
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depression, isolation, and loneliness." r In jurisdictions with a low
prevalence of the disease, isolation may be pronounced and may result in
the loss of access to prison services and programs. 74 This, in turn, may
cause the segregated prisoner to be ineligible for early parole because of
restrictions that keep him or her from participating in prison-based "goodbehavior" programs. 75 Opponents also argue that segregation of
prisoners with AIDS is no more desirable or defensible in an institutional
context than it is in the society as a whole. 76
There is irony in the courts' analyses of this issue. In suits brought by
prisoners asking that the courts mandate testing and segregation policies
to protect prisoners from AIDS, the courts decline to do so.' 7 At the
same time, courts have demonstrated their reluctance to overrule existing
testing and segregation policies. 178 In so doing, it might be that courts
have merely exercised deference to executive-branch power to regulate
prisons.'" It might also be argued, however, that the courts have
abdicated responsibility for a twice-disenfranchised class." 8 The only
conclusion that can be drawn at present is that there is no definite answer
on the legality of segregation policies within correctional institutions.
C. Condom-, Bleach-, and Needle-Distribution Programs
HIV precautionary measures involving distribution of condoms, clean
needles, and bleach,"' although no more controversial than segregation
and mandatory testing, have nevertheless been implemented by few
173. See id. at 23-25.

174. See id.
175. See id. at 23.
176. See id.
177. See T. HAMMErr STUDY, supra note 31, at 67.
178. See id.
179. See, e.g., Turnerv. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (upholding the constitutionality
ofprison-imposed regulations concerninginmate-to-inmate correspondenceand reiterating
that deference must be given to prison authorities); see also Alan v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342 (1987) (discussing the Court's opinion that prison administration is a task
that has been committed to the responsibility of the legislative and executive branches and
that separation of powers requires judicial restraint in prisoners' rights cases).
180. See, e.g., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshal" Thurgood Marshall's
Legacy, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1249 (1992) (discussing Justice Marshall's legal philosophy
that the Court's role is protector of the poor, disenfranchised, and powerless).
181. Cleansing agents such as bleach can be used to sterilize a needle. T. HAMMEr
STUDY, supranote 31, at 41.
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correctional systems." Because both sex and drug use are prohibited in
prisons," many correctional officials argue that by providing condoms,
needles, or bleach, the institution would be condoning conduct that is
prohibited by the correctional regulations."' The few systems that have
implemented such policies have acknowledged that sex and drug use
exist-and will likely continue to exist-in prisons regardless of what

safety measures are imposed, and have decided that protecting inmates
from contracting a deadly disease is of paramount importance. "
Prior to 1989, five prison systems implemented condom-distribution
policies."a Although these five programs remain intact,117 no system

has implemented such programs since 1989.111 Perspectives concerning
distribution policies differ among members of correctional staffs. Prison

medical staffs usually advocate condom availability, arguing that sex does
occur in prisons and that such a policy helps prevent infection and
disease." 8 Correctional managers and security staff, on the other hand,
stress the importance of enforcing regulations to maintain security and

institutional control."g It is interesting to note that of the five systems

currently utilizing a condom distribution policy, none has reported any
security problems resulting from the distribution program."'1

Opponents of condom distribution argue that no legitimate distinction
can be made between condom distribution and the distribution of bleach
and clean needles." 9 Yet, there appear to be more compelling safety and

security arguments in opposition to needle and bleach distribution than in
opposition to condoms." 9 On the other hand, the Australian correctional

182. See id. at 40; AIDS BULLETIN, supranote 24, at 10.
183. See T. HAMMETT STUDY, supra note 31, at 40; Lynn Weisberg, Responding
to Critics, 72 JUDICATURE 64, 65 (June-July 1988).
184. See AIDS BuLLETIN, supra note 24, at 10.
185. See id.
186. T. HAMMETTSTUMY, supranote 31, at 40. The following prison systems make
condoms available to inmates: Mississippi, Vermont, New York State, San Francisco,
and Philadelphia. Id.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.

191. See id.
192. See id. at 34 (articulating the "entering wedge" theory that "if we allow
condoms, why shouldn't we also allow bleach and clean needles?").
193. See id. (stating that it is thought that instruments such as needles and bleach
could potentially be used as weapons against correctional personnel or other inmates).

19921

N07E

system provided bleach for needle cleaning without any reported
problems. 1' 4
Many officials, such as New York Prison Commissioner Thomas A.
Coughlin Ill, take a hard-line approach against precautionary policies
involving condom and needle distribution." Coughlin has stated that
there are only three ways to contract HIV while in prison: sexual
transmission, intravenous drugs, and tattooing."9 Therefore, he said
"'[d]on't do any one of them or you'll die.'"'"
While policies involving condom, needle, and bleach distribution
remain controversial in the correctional setting, those policies that have
been implemented appear to be successful." 0 The key to a successful
distribution policy, "requires knowledgeable medical professionals to set
rules that define medical responsibility and to negotiate the realistic
implementation of those rules in a correctional setting."'"
D. Education
Preventive education, a method utilized by most correctional facilities,
is probably the least controversial alternative.' As the one policy area
where the interests of staff, inmates, and the public coincide,2"'
education has been described as perhaps the most effective means to
decrease the spread of AIDS because correctional facilities have "captive
audiences" comprised of people who have a great need for training and
educational programs.'
194. Id.
195. Weisberg, supranote 183, at 64-65.
196. Thomas A. Coughlin II,AIDS in Prisons: One CorrectionalAdministrator's
Recommended Policies and Procedures, 72 JUDICATURE 63, 66 (June-July 1988).
197. Weisberg, supra note 183, at 65 (quoting New York Prison Commissioner
Thomas A. Coughlin). The case of New York subway vigilante Bernhard Goetz suggests
that the issue may be more complex. Goetz failed to return a prison-issued disposable
razor to correctional officials. He claimed to have retained the razor to reuse it, in fear
of being issued a razor that was used by an HIV-infected inmate. Prison officials insisted
that all prisoners receive new razors. See Goetz 'JailRelease Delayed Over Razor, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 29, 1989, at B5.
198. See AIDS ADVISORY COUNCIL AD Hoc COMM. ON AIDS AND CORRECTIONAL
FACILmiEs, NEw YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, MANAGEMENT OF HIV INFECTION
IN NEW YORK STATE PRISONS 9-10 (1989).
199. Id. at 10.
200. See infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.

201. See NATIONAL INST.

OF JusTIcE,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

(May 1989).
202. T. HAMMETrT STUDY, supra note 31, at 29.
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Courts consider education to be an essential tool to decrease the
spread of AIDS. One court, for example, directed a prison to provide
educational materials to its inmates.' This suggests that evidence
indicating that a prison official failed to provide appropriate training and
education could be essential in a suit filed by a prisoner who became
infected with HIV while in custody.'
By 1991, approximately eighty percent of federal and state
correctional facility provide live HIV education for inmates. 5 This is
encouraging because a 1989 study reported that only two-thirds of the
federal and state systems provided live education in all of their
facilities.' Live training should be the cornerstone of efforts to educate
inmates and staff on the epidemic. It is also necessary, however, for
facilities to supplement traditional educational programs with counseling
and peer support to induce people to change their high-risk behaviors.'
A study conducted in 1990 indicates that for the first time every federal
and state system reported offering some form of individual
counseling. 20'
Many states supplement live education with other educational tools.
A film made by New York inmates, showing prisoners slowly dying of
AIDS over many months, has been used as a particularly effective
supplement to live education programs.' Shown to all incoming
inmates, the film carries a graphic and emotional message, unencumbered
by medical jargon.21° The film's message impacts deeply on prisoners
because the21film is made by inmates, for inmates, and is about the death
of inmates. 1
Whatever the method, it is reassuring that HIV education is becoming
more common within correctional facilities. This may be, in part, a result
of some courts mandating that prison systems act affirmatively to decrease
the spread of AIDS within prisons. It is unquestionable that this
effort, as supported by the courts, is a step in the right direction.
203. See LaRocca v. Dalsheim, 467 N.Y.S.2d 302, 310 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
204. AIDS BULLETIN, supra note 24, at 4-5, 10.
205. T. HAMMeT STUDY, supra note 31, at 30 fig.11.
206. See id. at30.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See Coughlin, supra note 196, at 66.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See LaRocca, 467 N.Y.S.2d at 310 (requiring prison officials to hand each
inmate a copy of the AIDS brochure prepared and published by the New York State
Department of Health).
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V. CONCLUSION

The AIDS epidemic has affected our society in numerous ways.
Unfortunately, the epidemic will surely worsen because there is no cure
on the horizon. Disproportionate numbers of infected individuals within
the correctional system, coupled with inmates' propensity to continue
high-risk behavior, intensifies the devastating impact of AIDS within
prisons.
Although it is true that incarcerated individuals are sentenced to prison
because they have committed a crime, it is also true that they retain many
constitutional rights. 13 The constitutional prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment imposes a specific standard of care on the correctional
system."' The dramatic escalation of AIDS within the prison system
makes it imperative that prison officials act to protect inmates from this
deadly disease in order to avoid unconstitutional conditions of
confinement.2 15 Although the courts have not held, as of yet, a prison
sentence to be unconstitutional based on these circumstances, it is likely
that it is only a matter of time until the right case presents a court with no
other option. As a matter of both public-policy considerations and
compliance with constitutional requirements, it is imperative that the
United States afford prisoners reasonable protection from the deadly
disease of AIDS.
D. Stuart Sowder
213. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 49-55, 64-71 and accompanying text.

